In 2013, Kar proposed a secure ID-based deniable authentication protocol whose security is based on computational infeasibility of solving Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Problem(ECDHP). Kar claimed that the proposed protocol achieves properties of deniable authentication, mutual authentication, and message confidentiality. However, this paper points out that Kar's protocol still suffers from sender spoofing attack and message modification attack unlike its claims.
Introduction
Deniable authentication protocol is a new security authentication mechanism which can enable a receiver to identify the true source of a given message, but not to prove the identity of the sender to a third party [1] . The deniable property [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ] is very useful for providing secure negotiation over the Internet and it has the following two features compared with traditional authentication protocols:
2. The intended receiver cannot prove to any third party the identity of the sender.
In the past several years, numerous deniable authentication protocols have been proposed but many of them have also been proven to be vulnerable to various cryptanalytic attacks [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] . In 2013, Kar [7] proposed a secure identity based deniable authentication protocol whose security is based on computational infeasibility of solving Diffie-Hellman Problem on Elliptic Curve(ECDHP). The security of the Kar's protocol is based on difficulty of breaking the ECDLP and secure one way hash function. Kar's protocol is an non-interactive protocol and can be easy implemented in mobile devices such as PDA, smart card etc. Kar claimed that the proposed protocol achieves properties of deniable authentication, mutual authentication, and message confidentiality [7, 6] . However, this paper points out that Kar's protocol still suffers from sender spoofing attack and message modification attack unlike its claims.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the Kar's protocol. The security flaws of Kar's protocol are shown in Section 3. Finally, conclusions are given in Section 4.
Review of Kar's Deniable Authentication Protocol
This section briefly reviews Kar's protocol [7] . Figure 1 depicts the Kar's deniable authentication protocol. The Kar's protocol involves two entities: a sender S and a intended receiver R. It follows the followings phases.
Setup phase Let H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l be a secure cryptographic hash function which is of collision. In Kar's protocol, the sender has a certificate issued by the certificate authority(CA). The CA contains the public key(π pub ) of the Receiver, and the signature of CA for the certificate. The sender can obtain (π pub ) and verify the validity of it. The private key(π prv ) of receiver is kept secret.
Extract phase It follows the following steps.
E1. The sender S with identity ID s ∈ {0, 1} * selects t s randomly from [1, n−1].
E2. S computes a s = H(ID s ) ⊕ t s and Q s = a s P , where (Q s , a s ) is the key pair of S.
E3. S concatenates Q s with the time stamp T ∈ Z * q .
E4. S encrypts the concatenated value (Q s ||T ) using receiver R's public key π pub asQ s = E π pub (Q s ||T ).
E5. Similarly, the receiver R with identity ID r ∈ {0, 1} * selects t r randomly from [1, n − 1].
E6. R computes a r = H(ID r ) ⊕ t r and Q r = a r P , where (Q s , a s ) is the key pair of R.
Send phase It follows the following steps.
S1. S sends the cipherQ s to the the receiver R.
S2. R decrypts using his/her own private key π prv as Q s = D πprv (Q s ), where D denotes decryption algorithm.
S3. R computes the session key α 1 = a r Q s and the hashed value as β = H(ID r , Q r , α 1 ).
S4. R sends the computed Q r and β to S.
S5. S computes the session key as
S6. S checks the equality β = H(ID r , Q r , α 2 ). If it holds, S is authenticated and Q r will be accepted, otherwise rejected.
S7. S computes γ 1 = H(α 2 ) ⊕ (M ||T ), where M ∈ {0, 1} l is the deniable message.
S8. S sends the deniable authenticated message ψ = (ID s , T, γ 1 ) to the recipient R.
Receive phase It follows the following steps.
R1. After receiving ψ = (ID s , T, γ 1 ), the receiver R recovers M by computing
R2. R verifies the validity of the equality γ 1 = γ 2 and the time stamp T . If holds then R accepts M otherwise reject. 
Cryptanalysis of Kar's Deniable Authentication Protocol
This section demonstrates that Kar's deniable authentication protocol still suffers from sender spoofing attack and message modification attack [7, 6] . 
Sender spoofing attack
An attacker Eve can perform the following sender spoofing attack.
1. Eve intercepts {Q s , ψ}, where ψ = (ID s , T, γ 1 ).
2.
Eve selects a random number t e ∈ [1, n − 1].
3. Eve computes a e = H(ID s ) ⊕ t e and Q e = a e P , where (Q e , a e ) is the key pair of Eve to impersonate as the sender S.
4.
Eve concatenates Q e with the time stamp T e ∈ Z * q .
5.
Eve encrypts the concatenated value (Q e ||T e ) using receiver R's public key π pub asQ e = E π pub (Q e ||T e ).
Eve sends the faked deniable authenticated message ψ * = (ID s , T e , γ * 1 ) to the recipient R.
After receiving {ψ * }, the recipient R will perform the following steps.
1. Recover M e by computing γ *
3. Verify the validity of the equality γ * 1 = γ 2 and the time stamp T e .
Because γ * 1 always equals γ 2 = H(α 1 )⊕(M e ||T e ), the recipient R will believe the trustworthy of the attacker Eve. Therefore, Kar's protocol is vulnerable to the above message modification attack.
Conclusions
This paper pointed out that recently proposed Kar's ID-based deniable authentication protocol based on Diffi-Hellman problem on Elliptic Curve suffers from sender spoofing attack and message modification attack. Further works will be focused on improving the Kar's protocol which can be able to provide strong security.
